Perspectives on Freedom of Conscience and Religion in the Jurisprudence of Constitutional Courts by Garlicki, Leszek Lech
BYU Law Review
Volume 2001 | Issue 2 Article 4
5-1-2001
Perspectives on Freedom of Conscience and
Religion in the Jurisprudence of Constitutional
Courts
Leszek Lech Garlicki
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, and the Religion Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Leszek Lech Garlicki, Perspectives on Freedom of Conscience and Religion in the Jurisprudence of Constitutional Courts, 2001 BYU L. Rev.
467 (2001).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2001/iss2/4
GAR-PP1.DOC 6/25/01 9:07 PM 
 
467 
Perspectives on Freedom of Conscience and Religion 
in the Jurisprudence of Constitutional Courts 
Leszek Lech Garlicki ∗  
This article1 attempts to summarize national reports on various 
aspects of religious freedom. Following a brief introduction in Part I, 
Part II outlines the approaches of constitutions and constitutional 
jurisprudence to determine relations between church and state. Part 
III addresses the ways of understanding the principle of freedom of 
religion, followed by Part IV which presents various principles of 
equality in reference to the position of churches and religious 
groups. Part V outlines the forms of cooperation between church 
and state, focusing in particular on education and religion teaching. 
This article is based on information and reports concerning the 
case law of constitutional courts in several European countries, in-
cluding Austria, Belgium, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the 
Federal German Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, and Turkey. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A discussion of freedom of religion requires consideration of re-
lations between churches and the state. Modern Christian societies 
now generally accept various versions of separation of church and 
state (mutual autonomy), acknowledging a distinction of domains 
belonging to each of them. But it is worthwhile to emphasize that, as 
indicated by Samuel Krislov,2 separation of church and state is mostly 
 
 ∗ Professor Garlicki completed the Faculty of Law and Administration at the Univer-
sity of Warsaw in 1968. He has lectured at dozens of universities in Poland, France, Germany, 
and the United States. He is currently a judge on the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland. 
 1. This presentation is based on the author’s General Report, which was delivered at 
the twenty-first Conference of Constitutional Courts of Europe (Warsaw, May 16–20, 1999). 
See CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE IN THE AREA OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND 
BELIEFS: XI CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS (Leszek Lech Garlicki 
ed., 2000) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE]. 
 2. Samuel Krislov, Alternatives to Separation of Church and State in Countries Outside 
the United States, in RELIGION AND THE STATE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LEO PFEFFER 421, 423 
(James E. Wood ed., 1985). 
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found in the doctrine of Western civilization and the great religions 
of the world adopt various concepts of church-state relations. Juda-
ism was originally linked with the state, and only historical events 
caused the eventual separation. The rebirth of the State of Israel al-
lowed a return to tradition, and today an interesting symbiosis of re-
ligion and state is observed. Christianity originated as a religion sepa-
rated from its antagonist, the state. Later links developed between 
Christian churches and various nations, which were understood dif-
ferently under Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant traditions. By 
contrast, Islam, from its very origins, has been aligned with the state; 
in this tradition, the identity of religion and government has always 
been one of Islam’s fundamental features.3 
From the European perspective, the Christian tradition is of fun-
damental significance.4 Therefore, most European constitutions and 
jurisprudence assume a predominantly Christian audience since other 
religions have always been in the minority. 
Even assuming this largely Christian audience, individual Euro-
pean nations have adopted vastly different schemes, which flow from 
their different histories and traditions. Consequently, along with tra-
ditionally Protestant states (e.g., Great Britain and the Scandinavian 
countries) and traditionally Catholic states (e.g., Austria, France, 
Spain, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Slovenia, Poland, Portugal, and Italy), 
there are European countries of mixed religious structure (e.g., 
Germany and Switzerland).5 Historically speaking, almost all coun-
tries formerly had a state church, and the political elite were more in-
terested in establishing and maintaining religious peace than ensur-
ing religious equality. In countries where historical development 
focused on evolution rather than revolution, there may still be found 
a very close linkage between a dominant religion and the state, 
namely Scandinavian countries and the Anglican Church in England. 
However, in a majority of Continental countries, the official relation-
ship between church and state eventually broke down. This separa-
tion of church and state is not meant to result in a lack of assistance 
or cooperation by the state to churches and does not foreclose the  
 
 
 3. See id. 
 4. Turkey is the only European country today where the Christian religion (or at least 
tradition) does not dominate. 
 5. The experience of United States of America is undoubtedly a significant inspiration 
for this version of church-state relations. 
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existence of some churches remaining closer to the state than other 
religious organizations or groups.6 
It is a self-evident truth that religious freedom—both for an indi-
vidual and for an institution—should be considered as a primary 
element of the more general principle of freedom based on pluralism 
and the protection of the minority. On the other hand, the church-
state relations define the approach and scope of individual religious 
freedoms to a certain extent. Both extreme solutions—a religious 
state (understood as a single-religion state) and an atheistic state 
(understood as an anti-religious state)—are very dangerous for the 
freedom of an individual generally and for religious freedoms specifi-
cally. 
Between these two extremes there are many versions of separa-
tion of and cooperation between church and state. As described by 
Professor W. Cole Durham, Jr.,7 there is a range of systems from the 
most strict—even hostile—separationist models to the most friendly, 
positive separationist schemes. This range includes models based on 
accommodation, cooperation, and even churches supported or pre-
ferred by the state. Whichever model has been adopted, all democ-
ratic European nations begin with the principle of freedom of the in-
dividual to hold a particular belief or associate with a chosen religion 
as provided for in Article 9 of the 1950 European Convention on 
Human Rights.8 It should be emphasized at this point that Article 9 
sets forth the freedom to manifest religion or belief, in community 
 
 6. When speaking about historical experience, one must not neglect the processes of 
atheism imposed by the communist state, resulting sometimes in an official treatment of ideol-
ogy in the quasi-religious category and providing an example of almost perfect symbiosis of 
state and ideology. See MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS IN A 
NUTSHELL 403–04 (1994). It was a short-lived experiment, but it clearly made a significant 
impact on the constitutional regulations adopted in that region of Europe. 
 7. W. Cole Durham, Jr., Bases para un estudio comparativo sobre libertad religiosa, in X 
ANUARIO DE DERECHO ECLESIASTICO DEL ESTADO 465 (1994). 
 8. Article 9 of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights states: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limita-
tions as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the inter-
ests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, art. 9, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
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with others and in public, and protects the teaching of religious be-
liefs as well. Therefore, regardless of different traditions, religious 
structures, or historical experience, there is a common level of free-
dom for all democratic European states that must be guaranteed in 
every country, for every religion, and for every belief. 
However, the manner of granting these guaranteed freedoms, in-
cluding the determination of relations between church and state, var-
ies vastly. No need for uniformity is recognized. On the contrary, the 
Declaration on the status of churches and non-confessional organiza-
tions of the Amsterdam Treaty states: “The European Union re-
spects and does not prejudice the status under national law of 
churches and religious associations or communities in the Members 
States. The European Union equally respects the status of philoso-
phical and non-confessional organizations.”9 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL MODEL OF CHURCH-STATE 
RELATIONS 
The issue of freedom of religion (in its individual as well as its 
collective aspect) is a delicate matter which is reflected in the careful 
approach taken by the authors of the various European constitutions 
on this issue. Drafters of European constitutions often encountered 
historical or social traditions with which they did not want to inter-
fere directly. 
A. Constitutional Provisions Regarding Church and State 
In Germany, the pertinent provisions of the 1919 Weimar Con-
stitution are still valid on several fundamental issues. Therefore, the 
decision of the drafters of the 1949 German Grundgesetz to absorb 
the so-called Weimar church provisions to the Constitutions was the 
result of “a compromise that become necessary because then propos-
als made during discussions on the Basic Law for a new regulation of 
the relationship between State and churches were unable to find any 
majority.”10 In Portugal, there is a complicated symbiosis maintained 
 
 9. 1997 O.J. (C 340) 133 (“L’Union européenne respecte et ne prejuge pas les statut 
dont beneficient en vertu du droit national, les Eglises et les associations ou communautés re-
ligieuses dans les États membres. L’Union européenne respecte également la statut des organi-
sations philosophiques et non confessionnelles.”). 
 10. D. Hoemig & W. Hassemer, Germany: Rechtsprechung der Verfassungsgerichte im 
Bereich der Bekenntnisfreiheit, in 1 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 339 
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between the 1940 Concordat with the Holy See, the 1971 Act on 
Religious Freedom, and the 1976 Constitution.11 In Italy, in the 
course of drafting the constitution, the Lateran Pacts were adopted 
as the system regulating the relations between the state and the 
Catholic Church.12 In France, following the concept of the “bloc of 
constitutionality,”13 some fundamental regulations are stipulated in 
the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, in the 
Preamble to the 1946 Constitution, and in the Law of December 9, 
1905 (which is considered to proclaim the “fundamental principles 
of the Republic”).14 For the historical reasons, certain provisions re-
lating to religious freedom flow from the Saint Germain Treaty for 
Austria and from the Treaty of Lausanne for Turkey, which were 
concluded after World War I. 
B. State Churches and the Separationist Models 
Within the above-mentioned meaning, there is no religious state 
in Europe and, likewise, no atheistic state at present.15 Nevertheless 
there are democratic countries which provide for the existence of a 
state church16 or an official or dominant state religion.17 The Swedish 
 
[hereinafter Hoemig & Hassemer]. 
 11.  J. de Sousa e Brito, La jurisprudence constitutionnelle en matière de liberté confes-
sionelle au Portugal, in 2 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 555 [hereinafter 
de Sousa e Brito]. 
 12. Article 7 of the 1947 Constitution provides: “The State and the Catholic Church 
are, each within its own ambit, independent and sovereign. Their relations are regulated by the 
Lateran Pacts. Such amendments to these Pacts as are accepted by both parties do not require 
any procedure of Constitutional amendment.” ITALY CONST. art. 7, in 9 CONSTITUTIONS OF 
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, Italy 48 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed.) [hereinafter CONSTI-
TUTIONS]. 
 13. See DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 148 (L. Favoreu ed., 2000). 
 14. Brigitte Basdevant-Gaudemet, La jurisprudence constitutionnelle en matière de liberté 
confessionnelle et le régime juridique des cultes et de la liberté confessionnelle en France, in 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 305 [hereinafter Basdevant-Gaudemet]. 
Furthermore, several eastern French departments have a separate legal system for historical rea-
sons. 
 15. It should be mentioned that the 1976 Constitution of communist Albania provided 
for an atheistic state: “The State does not recognise a religion, it supports and develops the 
atheistic propaganda to strengthen the scientific and material ideology among citizens.” 
 16. The 1953 Constitution of Denmark provides: “The Evangelical Lutheran Church 
shall be the Established Church of Denmark, and, as such, it shall be supported by the State.” 
DEN. CONST. art. 4, in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Denmark 15. 
 17. The 1814 Norwegian Constitution provides, “The Evangelical-Lutheran religion 
shall remain the official religion of the State. The inhabitants professing it are bound to bring 
up their children in the same.” NOR. CONST. art. 2, § 2, in 14 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 
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Church enjoyed a special constitutional status for many decades until 
recently when it was disestablished, at least in major part.18 At least in 
the traditional sense, the Anglican Church forms a part of the state 
machinery of England. Moreover, Israel represents a country with a 
very strong religious component; the very notion of “the Jewish 
State” speaks of the state’s attachment to a particular religion. Fi-
nally, Liechtenstein’s constitution (Article 37, Section 2, Sentence 1) 
provides a pertinent example: 
following the previous constitutional tradition, a strong significance 
of the Roman Catholic Church is recognized, making it the State 
church (Landeskirche), thus in other words, providing with the 
public and legal status. . . . The model implemented in the Consti-
tution may not be [however] considered as a legal regime setting 
forth and allowing for only one Church (State Church) or such 
where the state identifies with one Church only, still it is clearly ori-
ented to the Roman Catholic State Church.19 
Notwithstanding its preference for the Catholic Church, it is 
clear that Liechtenstein’s constitution and its constitutional prac-
tice—as with any of the other countries mentioned herein—respect 
freedom of religion within the meaning of Article 9 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
On the other hand, some constitutions define the state as “lay”20 
or “secular.”21 This should not necessarily be understood as a rejec-
 
12, at Norway 1. The 1975 Constitution of Greece provides, “The prevailing religion in 
Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Greece,” GREECE CONST. art. 3, in 7 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Greece 19; see also the 1991 Constitution of Bulgaria, infra 
note 37 (Eastern Orthodox). 
 18. See Kenneth Stegeby, An Analysis of the Impending Disestablishment of the Church of 
Sweden, 1999 BYU L. REV. 703. 
 19. H. Wille, Lichtenstein: Rechtsprechung der Verfasssungsgerichte im Bereich der Bek-
enntisnsfreiheit, in 2 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 466–67 [hereinafter 
Wille]. 
 20. The 1958 French Constitution (as amended July 31, 1995), provides, “France is an 
indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It assures the equality of all citizens before 
the law . . . . It respects . . . all beliefs.” FR. CONST. art 1, in 7 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 
12, at France 2; see also Corte cost., sez., 1989, n.203, (Italy). 
 21. The 1993 Russian Constitution provides, “1. The Russian Federation shall be a 
secular state. No religion may be instituted as state-sponsored or mandatory religion. 2. Reli-
gious associations shall be separated from the State and are equal before the law.” KONST. RF 
art. 14, in 15 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Russia 4. The concept of the “secular state” 
is also used in Belarus. Belarus: Constitutional Jurisprudence in the Area of Freedom of Religion 
and Beliefs, in 1 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 157. 
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tion of or hostility towards religion.22 In our contemporary under-
standing, it is rather a manner of expressing the neutrality of the 
state: “The judicial system is one of strict separation between the 
State and religious confessions. This means that the State does not 
officially recognize any one religion.”23 Another example of secular-
ism is found in Turkey. Article 2 of the 1982 Constitution of Turkey 
describes the Republic of Turkey as a “secular state.”24 This should 
be understood against the history of modernization of Turkey in the 
Ataturk period and against the role that Islam would like to play in 
modern times. Therefore,  
“the Constitutional Court has based its views regarding the free-
dom of religion and conscience on the principle of secularism, and 
it has also provided a contemporary meaning and content to that 
principle through its decisions. According to the Constitutional 
Court, secularism cannot be confined to a separation between the 
public and religious domain. It is an environment of freedom, civi-
lization and modernity with a larger scope and dimension. . . . 
What are determining and effective over the state are science and 
wisdom and not religious rules and requirements.”25 
C. The Principles of Non-identification and Neutrality 
In general, it seems that constitutions refrain from general defini-
tions such that the model of church-state relations is defined only in 
a country’s constitutional jurisprudence. Almost all national reports 
refer to two fundamental principles of constitutional jurisprudence 
on the subject of religious liberty: non-identification and neutrality. 
1. The principle of non-identification 
 Non-identification means that “according to the case law of the 
Constitutional Court, any system of a state Church, and even any 
 
 22. In this context, it is possible to talk about an “aggressive laicisme” which existed in 
France at the end of the nineteenths Century. See Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 283. 
 23. “Le regime juridique est celui d’une strict separation entre l’État et les confessions 
religieuses. Cela implique que l’État ne reconnaisse aucun culte.” Id. at 306. 
 24. In addition, Article 174 provides for special protection of this principle: “No provi-
sion of the Constitution shall be construed or interpreted as rendering unconstitutional the 
Reform Laws, indicated below, which aim . . . to safeguard the secular character of the Repub-
lic.” TURK. CONST. art. 174. 
 25. Turkey: Freedom of Conscience and Religion and Doctrines of the Constitutional 
Court, in 2 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 834 [hereinafter Turkey]. 
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system of identification of the state with a particular religion or a par-
ticular set of ideas, has to be excluded.”26 According to this principle, 
no state religion or official religion may exist in a country,27 not even 
a privileged religion.28 The rejection of official state churches or 
religions is best understood against the background principle of 
pluralism: 
the prohibition of any confusion of the religious functions and the 
state functions is warranted by the nonconfessional character of the 
 
 26.  Kucsko-Stadlmayer, Die Rechtsprechung des Oestereichischen Verfassungsgerichtshofs 
auf dem Gebiet der Glaubenfreiheit, in 1 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 
120 [hereinafter Kucsko-Stadlmayer]. 
 27. The 1919 Constitution of Germany (retained in force by Article 140 of the 1949 
Grundgesetz) provides, “There shall be no state church.” F.R.G. CONST. art. 137 § 1, in 7 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Germany 179. See also Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 
14, at 307; R. de Mendizabal Allende et al., Spain: La jurisprudence constitutionnelle en 
matière de liberté confessionnelle, in 2 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1 [here-
inafter de Mendizibal Allende et al.]; A. Hungerbuehler & M. Feraud, Switzerland: Die 
Rechtsprechung des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts im Bereich der Bekenntnisfreiheit, in 2 
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 820 [hereinafter Hungerbuehler & 
Feraud]; Russia: La liberté de conscience dnas la Féderation de Russie, in 2 CONSTITUTIONAL 
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 647 [hereinafter Russia].  
In the Czech Republic, Article 2, Section 1 of the 1991 Charter of Human Rights and 
Freedoms provides, “The State . . . must not be tied either to an exclusive ideology or to a par-
ticular religion.” CZECH REP. CONST., in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Czech Repub-
lic 152. 
In Lithuania, the 1992 Constitution provides: 
1. The State shall recognize traditional Lithuanian Churches and religious organiza-
tions, as well as other Churches and religious organizations provided that they have 
a basis in society and their teaching and rituals do not contradict morality or the law. 
2. Churches and religious organizations recognized by the State shall have the rights 
of legal persons. 
3. Churches and religious organizations shall freely proclaim the teaching of their 
faith, perform the rituals of their belief, and have houses of prayer, charity institu-
tions, and educational institutions for the training of priests of their faith. 
4. Churches and religious organizations shall function freely according to their can-
ons and statutes. 
5. The status of Churches and other religious organizations shall be established by 
agreements or by law. 
6. The teaching proclaimed by Churches and religious organizations, other religious 
activities, and houses of prayer may not be used for purposes which contradict the 
Constitution and the law. 
7. There shall not be a State religion in Lithuania 
LITH. CONST. art. 43, in 11 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Lithuania 6–7.; see also A. 
Matijosius, Some Legal Aspects of Religion and Belief in Lithuania, Address presented at the J. 
Reuben Clark Law School Annual Symposium on International Law and Religion (Oct. 2000). 
 28.  See Macedonia: Constitutional Jurisprudence in the Area of Freedom of Religion and 
Beliefs, in 2 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 501 [hereinafter Macedonia]. 
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state, which results from the pluralistic structure of religions exist-
ing in the society, as well as by the constitutional guarantee of reli-
gious freedom which applies to both, individuals and religious 
groups.29 
Non-identification should also be viewed as a guarantee of reli-
gious freedom (church autonomy) that prohibits the state from 
usurping functions of religious organizations. 
2. The principle of neutrality 
Neutrality is to a large extent synonymous with non-
identification. It is a result of a plurality of ideologies and religions, 
and, at the same time, it must mean non-identification. But neutral-
ity does not have to be equivalent to indifference by the state to-
wards religion as a social phenomenon. In this respect, the modern 
French notion of positive “laicism serves as the foundation of judicial 
principles that seek to ensure the neutrality of public power regard-
ing religion and to ensure equal treatment of diverse religious ex-
pressions.”30  
Neutrality means first of all state impartiality towards various ex-
isting religions and ideologies.31 But it also requires that the state ob-
serve principles of freedom32 and equality.33 In this sense, neutrality 
is understood as a consequence of separation.34 However, neutrality 
 
 29. See de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at 767. An understanding of the 
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is instructive in this context: “The ‘establishment of 
religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal 
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, 
or prefer one religion over another . . . .” Everson v. Board of Ed., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). See 
also Macedonia, supra note 28, at 503 (referring to a decision of the Constitutional Court con-
cerning the powers of the state authorities regarding in respect to issuing building permits). 
 30. Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 283 (“elle sert de fondement à des principes 
juridiques qui visent à assurer la neutralité des pouvoirs publics à l’egard du fait religieux et à 
assurer un traitement égal à ses diverses expressions”). 
 31. For example, the 1997 Constitution of Poland states, “The relationship between the 
State and churches and other religious organizations is based on the principle of respect for 
their autonomy and the mutual independence of each in its own sphere, as well as on the prin-
ciple of cooperation for the good of the individual and for the common good.” POL. CONST. 
art. 25, § 3, in 15 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Poland 6. 
 32. See the September 4, 1992 decision of the Czech Constitutional Court upholding 
the constitutionality of prohibition of movements propagating national, racial, class or religious 
hatred. 
 33. See infra Part IV. 
 34. See de Sousa e Brito, supra note 11, at 566. 
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should not eliminate the cultural tradition of particular societies, 
which in Europe have always been related to Christianity. Sometimes 
neutrality is reflected in the language of constitutional texts (e.g., In-
vocatio Dei and preambles to other constitutions,35 state symbols, the 
notion of “traditional” or “recognized” churches) and sometimes in 
ordinary statutes.36 
D. Separation, Autonomy, and Cooperation 
Non-identification and neutrality assume separation of church 
and state, but generally the separation is not an absolute one. Some 
constitutions directly set forth this principle of separation.37 But in 
post-Communist states, such separationist wording has negative his-
torical connotations38 and its usage is generally avoided. In Switzer-
 
 35. For example, the Preamble to the 1937 Constitution of Ireland states, “In the name 
of the Most Holy Trinity . . . We, the people of Eire, Humbly acknowledging all our obliga-
tions to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ . . . .” 9 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Ireland 1. 
The preamble to the 1949 German Grundgesetz [Constitution] begins, “Conscious of their 
responsibility before God and man . . . .” 7 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Germany 105. 
The Preamble to Poland’s 1997 Constitution similarly states, “We, the Polish Nation, all citi-
zens of the Republic, encompassing those who believe in God as the source of truth, justice, 
goodness and beauty, as well as those who do not share such faith but respect those universal 
values . . . recognizing our responsibility before God or our own consciences . . . .” XV 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Poland 1. The preamble to the 1999 Swiss Constitution 
begins, “In the Name of Almighty God!” 17 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Switzerland 
167. 
 36. For example, the preamble to a Lithuanian act provides that “the Lithuanian State is 
based on Christian cultural foundation of United Europe.” Lithuanian Constitutional Juris-
prudence in the Area of Freedom of Religion and Belief, in 2 CONSTITUTIONAL 
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 479 [hereinafter Lithuanian Jurisprudence]. 
 37. For example, the 1949 Hungarian Constitution states, “In the Republic of Hungary 
the Church functions in separation from the State.” HUNG. CONST. art. 60, § 3, in 8 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Hungary 16. This entails “a consequent separation of the 
churches from the State, the neutrality of the State in religious matters and the equality of the 
rights of all churches.” Adam, La jurisprudence constitutionnelle Hongroise en matière de liberté 
confessionnelle, in 1 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 365. See also PORT. 
CONST. art. 41, § 4, in 15 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Portugal 27 (“Churches and 
religious communities are independent of the State and are free to determine their own or-
ganization and to perform their own ceremonies and worship.”); SLOVN. CONST. art. 7, § 1, 
in 16 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Slovenia 2 (“The State and religious groups shall 
separate.” ); Article 14, Section 2 of the 1993 Constitution of Russia, supra note 21; BULG. 
CONST. art. 13, §§ 2, 3, in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Bulgaria 89 (“Religious in-
stitutions are separate from the State,” however, “[t]he Eastern Orthodox religion is the tradi-
tional religion of the Republic of Bulgaria.”). 
 38. See Slovenia: Constitutional Jurisprudence in the Area of Freedom of Religion and 
Belief, in 2 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 707 [hereinafter Slovenia]. 
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land, some cantons (e.g., Geneva and Neuenburg) have introduced 
the concept of separation of church and state, but in 1980, a popular 
referendum to implement complete separation of church and state 
was rejected.39 
The notion of separation of church and state means autonomy of 
both entities and should not be understood as a manifestation of 
state hostility towards religion40 or even as the manifestation of state 
indifference towards religion. In Portugal, the Constitution indicates 
that it “imposes laicité [separation of church and state] but not laic-
isme [a hostile implementation of this separation].”41 Austria is de-
scribed as “not a completely secular state, since the separation of 
Church and State has not been clearly conducted.”42 The German 
Federal Constitutional Court refers to the attitude of “separation not 
absolute but ‘lame’ (hinkende Trennung) featured as a transformed 
independence within the coordination system or as the partnership 
of churches and the State.”43 The system existing in Belgium is pre-
sented as the system which “is neither a concordat regime, nor an 
absolute separationist regime. It is a regime of reciprocal independ-
ence combined with a system of benefits accorded by the state to 
certain religions.”44 In Slovakia, one refers to “the specified separa-
tion of the State and churches and religious communities.”45 
In sum, the principal of separation of church and state is consid-
ered not only as admitting, but even as assuming, some cooperation 
between church and state. Even the definition of the state as “secu-
lar” is not contradictory to it: “The Constitution does not foresee  
 
 
 
 39. See Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra note 27, at 820. 
 40. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (stating, “But we find no 
constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for the government to be hostile to relig-
ion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence.”). 
 41. de Sousa e Brito, supra note 11, at 562. 
 42. Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 121. 
 43. Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 339. 
 44. The original French states, “n’est ni un regime concordataire, ni un regime de sepa-
ration absolute. C’est un regime d’independence reciproque combine avec un system d’aide 
positive accordeé par l’État à certains cultes.” E. Cerexhe & H. Boel, Belgium: La jurispru-
dence constitutionnelle en matière de liberté confessionnelle, in 1 CONSTITUTIONAL 
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 197 [hereinafter Cerexhe & Boel]. 
 45. Slovak Republic: Verfassungsmassige Entscheidungstatigkeit in der Sachen de 
Glaubensfreiheit, in 2 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 670 [hereinafter 
Slovak Republic]. 
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any cooperation between the state and religious communities. Nev-
ertheless, the state shall not ignore religion.”46 
In some constitutions, however, the notion of “separation” is re-
placed by the notion of “autonomy and cooperation.”47 Such a de-
piction does not only demonstrate that these constitutions do not 
prohibit state cooperation with (and thus some assistance to) 
churches, but also suggests that it is possible to define certain state 
obligations in this area. Thus, according to Article 16, Section 3 of 
the 1978 Constitution of Spain, “public authorities take into consid-
eration religion of society and maintain the resulting cooperation 
with the Catholic Church and other religions.” This is linked with 
the conviction that “respect of religious beliefs belongs to the foun-
dations of democratic cohabitation.”48 In a similar context, the Swiss 
drafters mention a state obligation to guarantee religious peace49 and 
a Hungarian author indicates that “religious values are considered as 
constitutional values. Therefore, the protection and promotion of re-
ligious values by the State is effected through a traditional coopera-
tion.”50 In the Italian system, the principle of a secular state (ex-
pressed in Decision Number 203 of 1989) is one of the defining 
elements of the Italian regime. This does not mean that the state 
must ignore existing religions but rather constitutes a state guarantee 
for the protection of religious freedom in the pluralistic religious and 
cultural system.51 In the 1987 decision of Constitutional Court of 
Portugal, it was stated that the state obligation is not only to allow 
the operation of particular religions but that the state is obliged to 
cooperate with such religions as “religious needs have become a le-
gally recognized right that the state must ensure.”52 The 1993 deci-
sion of the Polish Constitutional Court indicated that separation 
does not assume isolationism or competitiveness but rather an op-
portunity to cooperate in domains which serve the common good 
 
 46. The original French states, “La Constitution ne prevoit aucune cooperation entre 
l’État et communautés religieuses. Neamoins, les pouvoirs publics et le legislateur n’ignore pas 
le fait religieux.” Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 311. 
 47. See, e.g., art. 25, § 3 of the 1997 Constitution of Poland, supra note 31. 
 48. de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at 770. 
 49. See Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra note 27, at 805. 
 50. Adam, supra note 37, at 369. 
 51. See Italy: La jurisprudence constitutionnelle en matière de liberté confessionnelle, in 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 425 [hereinafter Italy]. 
 52. The original French states, “les besoins religieux sont devenus un bien juridique que 
l’État doit assuré.” de Sousa e Brito, supra note 11, at 587. 
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and the development of the individual.53 
Regardless of the constitutional wording and the language of ju-
dicial decisions, the “wall of separation” between church and state is 
nowhere to be found today. On the contrary, the constitutional pat-
tern of cooperation (sometimes also understood as enhancing posi-
tive state obligations to support churches) should be considered as 
the most commonly accepted model. 
III. THE FREEDOM TO ESTABLISH RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES: 
“RECOGNIZED CHURCHES” 
State approaches to churches and religious communities are pri-
marily determined by the principle that an individual is guaranteed 
freedom of religion. Thus, the state may not abolish or differentiate 
the freedom of establishing churches and religious communities nor 
may it discriminate against or favor individuals because of their reli-
gious affiliation (or lack thereof). This prohibition against discrimi-
nation is reflected both in constitutional provisions and in the case 
law of constitutional courts. 
In the countries discussed herein, there is a recognized freedom 
to establish churches and other religious communities. But this free-
dom does not bar the state from participation in such processes. 
When a religious community seeks recognition, it usually looks for 
some support from the state, and thus must undergo some form of 
state procedures. There are two fundamental models in this area: 
registration with the state as a religious entity and formation of an 
association under private law. 
A. State Registration and Private Associations 
1. State Registration 
The first model consists of a uniform requirement of state regis-
tration of churches and religious communities. If a given religious 
community wishes to obtain such status, it has to be registered. Only 
in a few states is registration an obligatory condition for a church to 
 
 53. See, e.g., A. Maczynski, Poland: Freedom of Religion and Beliefs in the Jurisprudence 
of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, in 2 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 
543 [hereinafter Maczynski]. Since 1997 the principle of cooperation is grounded in Article 
25, Section 3 of the Constitution of Poland. See supra note 31. 
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be able to operate at all.54 As a general rule, there are no legal obsta-
cles to operate without registration,55 but if a church is not regis-
tered, it is impossible to obtain a legal personality and receive some 
legal benefits.56 To register a community, several requirements are 
generally specified: 1) documentation of a specified number of fol-
lowers (e.g., 10 persons in Russia and Belarus, 15 persons in Lithua-
nia, and 100 persons in Hungary); 2) furnishing the state with inter-
nal statutes (this may also include information about the group’s 
doctrine in order to assess the religious nature of the group); and 3) 
information about the composition of church authorities. As a gen-
eral rule, the power to register belongs to a state administrative 
agency (in the form of an administrative decision)57 and generally, 
there is a guarantee of judicial review.58 
Although the registration system is uniform, a different approach 
is sometimes used for traditional churches. In Lithuania, the Act on 
Religious Communities and Associations distinguishes “traditional” 
religious communities (the notion of “church” is not used by this 
Act), combining the term tradition with a historical, spiritual, and 
social heritage of Lithuania. Such traditional communities have been 
recognized ex lege. Nontraditional religious communities must be 
registered. While there is no legal impediment to nontraditional re-
ligions being granted the status of traditional communities, this may 
only occur after twenty-five years.59 In Russia, the 1997 Act on Free-
dom of Belief and on Religious Associations provided for a facilitated 
registration procedure for religious organizations which have existed 
in a given area for at least fifteen years. Under the Act, other organi-
zations would have to renew their registration annually.60 The annual 
re-registration requirement was subsequently challenged before the 
 
 54. See Slovak Republic, supra note 45, at 668; Macedonia, supra note 28, at 502–03. 
 55. See, e.g., Lithuanian Jurisprudence, supra note 36, at 478. But see Russia, supra note 
27, at 651 (noting that in Russia the law requires that the state authorities be notified about 
the creation of a religious community). 
 56. See, e.g., Romania: Rapport relatif à la jurisprudence constitutionnelle en matière 
confessionnelle, in 2 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 632 [hereinafter Ro-
mania] (noting significantly the difference between “recognized” and “barely tolerated” relig-
ions). 
 57. See Slovenia, supra note 38, at 705. 
 58. In Hungary, a registration, as such, is already made by the court. See Adam, supra 
note 37, at 367. 
 59. See Lithuanian Jurisprudence, supra note 36, at 487. 
 60. See Russia, supra note 27, at 651. 
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Russian Constitutional Court. In a decision dated November 23, 
1999, the Court did not invalidate this provision but, in deciding 
that it does not apply to churches that had come into existence be-
fore the 1997 Act was adopted, the decision left the provision with-
out any real significance. 
2. Association Status 
The second model consists of admitting churches and religious 
communities to be organized in the form of an association or other 
private law organization. According to this model, religious groups 
fall under a general system of organizations and are not differentiated 
by a separate (and more restrictive) registration procedure. Notwith-
standing this nondifferentiation, in most countries, a group of tradi-
tional churches continue to maintain differing legal status, which fol-
lows from the understanding that legal provisions do not wish to 
ignore the sociological fact of the stabilizing effects of certain relig-
ions. 
Even in France, where the principle of separation of church and 
state is understood as the strictest, these facts are recognized by law. 
In principle, there is no need for the state to recognize particular re-
ligions. Religious organizations or groups wishing to be included 
into the structure of state law and to obtain legal personality use the 
form of an association. Those groups not accorded the status of an 
association cultuelle, cannot be granted some privileges, particularly 
in regard to financial matters.61 At the same time, although, “legally 
speaking, the State does not recognize any religion, in practice it 
knows six.”62 Notwithstanding the strict separationist French model, 
in practice six major religions are granted the status of state coopera-
tion. In Belgium, the idea of state recognition was already present in 
the nineteenths century in the constitutional provisions discussing 
“recognized religions”63 or “public worship.”64 This status allows 
 
 61. See Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 303, 310 (giving information about a 
recent decision of the Lyon Court attempting to define religion). 
 62. The original French states: “juridiquement, l’État ne ‘reconnait’ aucun culte, en 
pratique il en ‘connait’ six.” Id. at 306. 
 63. The 1831 Constitution provides: 
Education is free; any preventive measures shall be forbidden; the punishment of 
misdemeanors shall be regulated only by law or decree. The Community shall guar-
antee the freedom of choice of parents. The Community provides neutral instruc-
tion. Neutrality implies, in particular, respect for the philosophical, ideological, or 
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churches to enjoy support from the state. Historical and sociological 
realities are decisive in this case.65 
A historical criterion is clearly articulated in Article 137, Section 
5 of the 1919 German Constitution which provided that those reli-
gious communities with the status of a public association before the 
Constitution became effective maintained the same legal position ex 
lege. Other communities may receive status of a public association if 
their structure and the number of members guarantees their long-
term durability.66 The remaining religious communities may have 
civil law status which is limited in its privileges.67 
In Austria, a system of recognized churches is applied. The rec-
ognition of churches is effected by statutes of Parliament, and, thus, 
a church is granted the legal position of a public institution. The 
above-mentioned regulations date back to 1874 and formulate the 
most important requirements of recognition (e.g., at least 2,000 fol-
lowers, a positive faith in God, a defined source of faith, economic 
and personal ability to establish the church, and at least one religious 
community). It seems plausible that the Austrian regulation was a 
distant inspiration of the registration system adopted in the modern 
Eastern Europe. At present, eleven churches and communities are 
recognized in this way. The Roman Catholic Church has “historical 
recognition” attributable to the fact that Catholicism was the state 
religion in Austria until 1867.68 In Poland, a registration system is 
applied. Simultaneously, the Polish Constitution provides for a statu-
tory form of regulation over relations between the state and several 
 
religious conceptions of parents and pupils. The schools organized by public au-
thorities shall offer, up through the end of obligatory schooling, a choice between 
instruction in one of the recognized religions or instruction in nonreligious moral-
ity. 
BELG. CONST. art. 24, § 1, in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Belgium 4. 
 64. Article 181, Section 1 provides, “The salaries of ministers of religion are chargeable 
to the State . . . .” Id. at 40. 
 65. See, e.g., Cerexhe & Boel, supra note 44, at 201 (indicating that there are six “rec-
ognized cults” and recalling that the 1993 Amendment to the Constitution has extended the 
application of Article 181 to nonreligious lay organizations). 
 66. The Federal Constitutional Court has indicated that durability means the ability of a 
religious community to fulfill for a substantial period its obligation. Of particular importance 
was the 1991 Decision in the Bahá’í communities case. 
 67. See, e.g., Gerhard Robbers, Religious Freedom in Germany, 2001 BYU L. REV. 650–
51 (referring to a pending case concerning the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ claim to receive “public 
law association” status). 
 68. See Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 103. 
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important churches and separately refers to the Catholic Church.69 
In Switzerland, “main churches” received the status of a public 
legal corporation. Cantons make such decisions, which are often in-
cluded in the very text of the cantons’ constitutions. In practice, this 
means that a church is recognized as a legal and public institution 
“upon a referendum effected in accordance with the requirements of 
democracy.”70 Accordingly, there are three “traditionally main 
churches.” Other religious communities may be organized only in 
private-law forms, and if they are established as ordinary associations, 
then they are exempted from registration. In Liechtenstein, a Lande-
skirche still exists, and the Catholic Church enjoys the status of a 
public law person. Other religions may be granted such status pursu-
ant to a statute of Parliament, which has not yet been promulgated. 
Therefore, other religions adopt private law forms for their organiza-
tion.71 In Portugal, a unique position for the Catholic Church results 
from the Concordat, which grants the Catholic Church an interna-
tional legal person status. Other churches operate now in the form of 
private law associations but the draft act on religious freedom seeks 
to amend it.72 
The Spanish system is seemingly the closest one to registration. 
Although religious communities may be established without an ini-
tial authorization and registration, in order to be granted a special 
legal status it is necessary to be registered by the Minister of Justice. 
The principle of concluding agreements between the state and the 
most significant churches providing for the scope of their relations 
with the state seems to be of the utmost importance.73 The 1978 
Constitution of Spain refers separately to the Catholic Church.74 This 
 
 69. The 1997 Constitution provides: 
The relations between the Republic of Poland and the Roman Catholic Church are 
determined by international treaty concluded with the Holy See, and by law. 
The relations between the Republic of Poland and other churches and religious or-
ganizations are determined by laws adopted pursuant to agreements concluded be-
tween their appropriate representatives and the Council of Ministers. 
POL. CONST. art. 25, §§ 4, 5, in 15 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Poland 6. 
 70. Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra note 27, at 824. 
 71. See Wille, supra note 19, at 464–65. 
 72. See de Sousa e Brito, supra note 11, at 580–82. 
 73. See de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at 775. 
 74. Article 16, Section 3 provides, “No religion shall have a state character. The public 
powers shall take into account the religious beliefs of Spanish society and maintain the appro-
priate relations of cooperation with the Catholic Church and other denominations.” 17 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Spain 46. 
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unique treatment of the Catholic Church is understandable given 
both the confessional structure of Spanish society as well as the quite 
recent historical experience of the state church. 
B. Concluding Agreements and Concordats 
There are different forms of legal regulation of churches and reli-
gious organizations. The fundamental issues are decided at the con-
stitutional level in all states (or by other acts of constitutional rank, 
such as the French Law of 1905). In most countries there are also 
statutes which specify generally the relation between church and 
state, and pertain uniformly to all churches and religious groups. 
Frequently, general Freedom of Religion Acts occupy a privileged 
position within a country’s legal system.75 Usually, more detailed 
provisions are laid out in other legislative statutes or in regulations 
issued by other governmental bodies. The distinction between exter-
nal and internal matters follows from the general principle of auton-
omy of churches, and it is assumed that the legislature may regulate 
only external matters.76 
In some countries there are separate statutes regulating the posi-
tion of particular churches and religions. It is typical for states which 
differentiate recognized churches to regulate them in separate stat-
utes, thereby admitting and even assuming a different position for 
these particular churches based on their public role. Such regulation 
may coexist (e.g., Austria and Poland) or replace (e.g., Belgium) the 
general Freedom of Religion Act discussed above. In Austria, specific 
statutes are applicable to four churches (and seven more have been 
recognized by way of ordinance).77 There are six such recognized 
churches in Belgium78 and twelve in Poland. Because, in Poland, the 
system of separate statutes has been linked to negotiated agreements 
between the state and various churches, this protection affords more 
durable relations. 
The practice of concluding agreements between the state and 
particular churches or religious organizations is also widespread. 
 
 75. In Romania, it should be adopted as the Organic Act. ROM. CONST. art. 72, § 2(n). 
In Hungary, its adoption requires an absolute majority of two-thirds of all votes cast. See 
Adam, supra note 37, at 361. 
 76. See, e.g., Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra note 27, at 821 (referring to a 1994 deci-
sion of the Federal Supreme Court). 
 77. See Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 122. 
 78. See Cerexhe & Boel, supra note 44, at 201. 
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These concluding documents make it possible to tailor the relation-
ship according to the traits of particular religions. The form of these 
agreements also provides for additional guarantees for the church 
because they limit the possibility of unilateral actions of the state.79  
Such agreements exist in Germany, Italy, Spain, Hungary, Po-
land, and Romania. In Lithuania, concluding agreements are pro-
vided for in Article 43, Section 5 of the Constitution.80 In Italy, rela-
tions between the state and non-Catholic religions may be regulated 
in the form of accords, as a basis for the issuance of legislative stat-
utes.81 In Spain, concluding agreements have been formed with three 
fundamental religions, but in order to come into effect each agree-
ment has to be approved in the form of an legislative act. This means 
that, among other things, the provisions of the agreement subject to 
such approval have the legal significance of a statute passed by the 
legislature.82 The same regulation is provided for in the draft of the 
new Portuguese Act on Religious Freedom.83 The relations between 
the state and the most prominent churches in Poland are provided 
for by statute. However, the 1997 Constitution in Article 25, Sec-
tion 5 requires that these statutes “are adopted pursuant to the 
agreements concluded between the Council of Ministers and appro-
priate representatives” of particular churches. Thus, when Parliament 
adopts these statutes, it is bound by the provisions of the agree-
ments.84 
The Concordats between the Holy See and particular countries 
are unique because they specifically apply to the status of the Catho-
lic Church and various aspects of the Catholic Church’s cooperation 
with the state. For example, in Poland, the Constitution adopts the 
concordat form of regulation.85 In several other countries, the 
Catholic Church’s special status follows from tradition and a 
recognition of the particularly important role of the Catholic 
Church. However, it should be noted that concordats are not 
utilized in all countries and that it is possible to enter into more than 
 
 79. See Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 346. 
 80. See supra note 27. 
 81. It applies practically to five religions. See Italy, supra note 51, at 425. 
 82. See de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at 774. 
 83. See de Sousa e Brito, supra note 11, at 579. 
 84. See Maczynski, supra note 53, at 549. See also the 1998 decision of the Constitu-
tional Court dealing with rights of the churches to be consulted during the legislative proce-
dure. 
 85. See supra note 69. 
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countries and that it is possible to enter into more than one interna-
tional agreement with the Holy See (e.g., Spain and Hungary). 
Some countries do not see the need to enter into a concordat.86 
The consequence of entering into a concordat (or other similar 
agreements) is that the relation between the state and the Catholic 
Church is partially transferred into the domain of international law. 
Consequently, concordats are a more complete guarantee that the 
agreed-upon regulatory arrangement will not be unilaterally changed 
by the state. Nevertheless, the provisions of the concordat must con-
form to pertinent constitutional provisions.87  
In Italy, Article 7 of the 1947 Constitution refers the regulation 
of the relations of the state and the Catholic Church to the 1929 
Lateran Pacts, at the same time providing that “the amendment to 
the Pacts approved by both parties does not require the Constitution 
to be amended.” Against this backdrop, there are several significant 
decisions of the Constitutional Court connected with the 1984 
Amendment to the Concordat.88 Moreover, in Portugal, the concor-
dat precedes the Constitution, but as opposed to the situation in It-
aly, the Portuguese Constitution does not deal with this issue. It 
provides grounds to the statements about a silent repeal of certain 
concordat provisions, and the courts do not have an easy task in ad-
justing these documents.89 
C. State Limitations on Religious Freedom 
The general principle of freedom to establish churches and reli-
gious organizations is not absolute and may be subjected to certain 
limitations.90 In the countries discussed herein, mechanisms of state 
supervision exist. Most notably, two important limitations include: 
1) repeal of state-granted registration status; and 2) dissolution of an 
 
 86. See, e.g., Lithuanian Jurisprudence, supra note 36, at 484; Slovenia, supra note 38, 
at 701. 
 87. See the 1957 decision of the German Constitutional Court on the effects of the 
constitutional principle of federalism on the provisions of the 1933 Concordat. 
 88. See, in particular, decision no. 203/1989 of the Constitutional Court which pro-
vides for the verification of the conformity of the Concordat provisions with the “supreme 
principles of the Constitutional order.” 
 89. See de Sousa e Brito, supra note 11, at 555. 
 90. Article 9, Section 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights discusses appro-
priate state limitations that may be placed upon religious liberty. See European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 
1950, art. 9, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
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association created under private law. These two limitations are par-
ticularly significant in light of the development of new churches and 
para-religious groups. 
1. The phenomenon of so-called sectes 
In the countries discussed herein, there are no legal provisions 
directly referring to the phenomenon of so-called sectes.91 Indeed, 
“the notion of a secte does not correspond with any legal category in 
our system.”92 However, the issue has already emerged in the politi-
cal sphere.93 
In principle, sectes may invoke principles of religious freedom and 
act within the system of churches and religious organizations.94 But 
to do so, a registration would be required or, at least, a recognition 
by the state, if a given religious organization is to receive support 
from the state. For this reason, it becomes necessary to determine 
whether a given group is indeed religious. It is beyond doubt that 
the status of a religious group may not be granted to an organization 
that, for example, represents national socialist ideology or is based on 
a particular language or ethnic identity.95 The law may also require 
that the motivations or objectives of a group are “not directed to 
achieve only worldly goods.”96 A registration or recognition may also 
be rejected if religious activity is not the only objective of the 
group.97 
In Portugal, the 1971 Act does not allow any activities related to 
the metaphysical or parapsychological phenomena to be included in 
 
 91. Secte translates directly into English as “cult.” 
 92. de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at 763; accord Basdevant-Gaudemet, 
supra note 14, at 301; Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 118; Russia, supra note 27, at 
646; Lithuanian Jurisprudence, supra note 36, at 483; Wille, supra note 19, at 463. For Por-
tugal, de Sousa e Brito draws attention to the fact that the very use of the notion of secte may 
raise constitutional doubts. See supra note 11, at 565. 
 93. For a discussion of parliamentary actions in France, see Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra 
note 14, at 301–02; for the same in Spain, see de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at 
763–64. 
 94. See Slovenia, supra note 38, at 677. 
 95. See Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 98 (citing decisions of the Austrian Con-
stitutional Court). 
 96. See the 1998 decision of the Polish Supreme Administrative Court regarding the 
Church of Scientology. 
 97. See Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 303 (citing several decisions of the 
French Conseil d’État pertaining to Jehovah’s Witnesses). 
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the notion of religion.98 In Italy, the religious nature of a group has 
to be proven, at least where a group claims tax exemptions or seeks 
other benefits from the state.99 In Bulgaria, the state seeks to limit 
the establishment of associations whose activities are not covered by 
the constitutional freedom of religion.100 
Even if it were possible to categorize a secte as a religious organi-
zation,101 limitations still exist that even recognized churches or reli-
gious groups must respect. The activities of sectes are protected by re-
ligious freedom principles if “protection granted is not contradictory 
to other constitutional values and if their behavior does not cause a 
noticeable harm for society or fundamental rights of other peo-
ple.”102 Thus, activities of sectes must be in compliance with the 
law.103 
The role of the state is particularly strong in countries which 
adopt the registration system because groups whose activities violate 
the law (and in particular threaten the interests of minors) may not 
be registered or their registration may be revoked.104 The question 
arises to what extent the criterion of loyalty to the state should be 
considered.105 
In deciding whether a particular limitation of para-religious prac-
tices should be allowed, the courts have adopted a test of propor-
tionality.106 Of course a question arises whether such limitations can 
also be imposed on traditional churches with an international pres-
ence. The general boundary of such limitations is set by the prohibi-
tion of discriminatory treatment, to be discussed below. 
 
 98. See de Sousa e Brito, supra note 11, at 565. 
 99. See Italy, supra note 51, at 396. 
 100. See Bulgaria: Constitutional Jurisprudence in the Area of Freedom of Religion and 
Beliefs, in 1 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 227 [hereinafter Bulgaria]. 
 101. See id. at 303 (citing a 1997 French case involving the Church of Scientology). 
 102. Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 329 (citing a 1972 decision of the Federal 
Constitutional Court). 
 103. See Slovenia, supra note 38, at 697; Romania, supra note 56, at 629. 
 104. See Czech Republic: Constitutional Jurisprudence in the Area of Freedom of Religion 
and Beliefs, in 1 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 265 [hereinafter Czech 
Republic]. See also the examples from Russia, Russia, supra note 27, at 654, and Belarus, Bela-
rus, supra note 21, at 156. 
 105. For example, since Jehovah’s Witnesses refuse any kind of military service (even the 
so-called Ersatzdienst), their church still lacks the status of a “public law association” in Ger-
many. See Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 351. 
 106. See Czech Republic, supra note 104, at 265 (describing the ban on the cult of Satan 
due to the protection of morals in that country). 
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The constitutional courts are also ready to affirm that secte mem-
bership may have adverse effects on the exercise of other rights and 
freedoms. For example, the Swiss Federal Court affirmed the with-
drawal of a license for a security guard company that was linked to a 
dangerous secte. The same court refused a license to establish a pri-
vate school to an entity close to the Church of Scientology.107 More-
over, a 1992 French court decision affirmed the denial of permission 
to adopt children for those who are prohibited by their religion to 
accept blood transfusions.108 Finally, there is no constitutional viola-
tion if the state undertakes or financially supports activities aimed at 
informing young people about the dangerous activities of specific sec-
tes.109 
In conclusion, churches or religious organizations, from the 
moment of establishment or recognition by the state, are not treated 
in the same way. It should be regarded as an expression of certain 
regularity: within the general principle of equality and non-
discrimination there is a difference in the placement of particular 
churches and religious groups. In the doctrine, this phenomenon is 
described as the “defined multi-tiered structure of religious enti-
ties.”110 
IV.  THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY: CRITERIA OF PERMITTED 
DIFFERENTIATION 
A. The Principle of Equality of Individuals in the Religious Liberty 
Context 
All civilized legal orders provide for the general principle of 
equality concerning the legal status of their citizens. At the same 
time, many constitutions make special reference to the principle of 
equality as it specifically pertains to religion. Many constitutions 
clearly prohibit discrimination based on religion.111 
 
 107. See Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra note 27, at 819–20. 
 108. See Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 304. 
 109. See Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 348; Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra 
note 27, at 820, 822. 
 110. Silvio Ferrari, Church and State in Europe: Common Patterns and Challenges, in 
WHICH RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CHURCHES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION?: THOUGHTS 
FOR THE FUTURE (H.-J. Kiderlen et al. eds., 1995) (citing opinions of W. Cole Durham, Jr.). 
 111. See, e.g., ITALY CONST. art. 3, in 9 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Italy 47 (“All 
citizens . . . are equal before the law, without distinction as to . . . religion . . . .” ); F.R.D. 
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This understanding of equality of individuals resulted in the de-
velopment of case law in many countries, which treats the ban of dis-
crimination as one of the premises of freedom of religion. “The prin-
ciple of equality prevents all types of discrimination between citizens 
and religious communities based on their ideology or beliefs, such 
that religious attitudes can not justify difference of treatment under 
the law.”112 In this area, general interpretation of the principle of 
equality, in particular the principle of proportionality, are applied. 
B. The Principle of Equality of Groups in the Religious Liberty Context 
In contrast to its application to individuals, the application of the 
principle of equality to churches and religious groups is far more 
complex. Some constitutions explicitly provide for equality before 
the law for churches or religious groups (e.g., Article 7, Section 2 of 
the 1991 Slovenian Constitution113 and Article 14 of the 1993 Rus-
sian Constitution.)114 In Poland, the 1997 Constitution provides for 
“equality of rights” of churches and religious organizations,115 which 
is, however, not equivalent to the general notion of equality. In 
Hungary, the 1990 Act on Freedom of Religion and on Churches 
provides for that “churches exercise identical rights and are encum-
bered with identical duties.” The Italian Constitution, although it 
refers specifically to the Catholic Church, assumes as a general prin-
ciple that all religions are equal before law. 
 
CONST. art. 3, § 3, in 7 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Germany 106 (“Nobody shall be 
prejudiced or favoured because of their . . . religion . . . .” ); RUSS. CONST. art. 19, § 2, in 15 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Russia 6 (“The State shall guarantee the equality of rights 
and liberties regardless of . . . attitude to religion . . . . Any restriction of the rights of citi-
zens . . . on religious grounds shall be forbidden.” ); HUNG. CONST. art. 70/A, § 1, in 8 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Hungary 17 (“The Republic . . . guarantees for all persons 
in its territory human and civil rights without discrimination on account of . . . religion . . . .”); 
LITH. CONST. art 29, § 1, in 11 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Lithuania 4 (“A person 
may not have his rights restricted in any way, or be granted any privileges, on the basis of . . . 
religion . . . .”); see also Article 6 of the 1955 Staatsvertrag von Wien. 
 112. de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at 766 (quoting a 1982 decision of the 
Constitutional Court of Spain) (“Le principe d’égalité pour sa part empêche d’établir tout type 
de discrimination entre les citoyens et les communautés religieuses en fonction de leur ideolo-
gie ou croyances, de façon que les attitudes religieuses des sujects de droit ne peuvent justifier 
de difference du traitement juridique.”); see also Cerexhe & Boel, supra note 44, at 178–79 
(citing a 1993 decision of the Cour d’Arbitrage of Belgium). 
 113. See supra note 37. 
 114. See supra note 21. 
 115. “Churches and other religious organizations shall have equal rights.” POL. CONST. 
art. 25, § 1, in 15 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Poland 6. 
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However, at the constitutional level, the differentiation of 
churches is often implied or allowed. Clearly, it is seen in all coun-
tries where there is an official state church. Even where there is not a 
state church, constitutions may refer to a particular church. Such is 
the case with the Constitutions of Spain116 and Poland,117 which refer 
specifically to the Catholic Church. Similarly, the Orthodox Church 
is referenced in the 1991 Constitution of Macedonia118 and in the 
1991 Constitution of Bulgaria.119 In Portugal, the 1940 Concordat 
requires that the state recognize “the principles of Christian doctrine 
and morality, traditional for the country.”120 The 1997 Russian Law 
on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations recognizes “a 
particular role of Orthodox religion in the history of Russia, for the 
future and the development of spirituality and culture” and expresses 
respect for Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism and other relig-
ions.121 Other constitutions, like that of Belgium, name no religion 
but formulate a category of recognized religions or cults. These ex-
amples all suggest situations “in which main religions are privileged 
to some extent,”122 and this observation seems to be representative 
for almost all countries discussed herein.123 
The scope of privileges granted to “main churches” depends on 
many factors but primarily on the religious structure of society. Privi-
leges for traditional churches will be found in particular in those 
 
 116. See supra note 74. 
 117. See supra note 69. 
 118. The precise language states: 
The freedom of religious confession is guaranteed. 
The right to express one’s faith freely and publicly, individually or with others is 
guaranteed. 
The Macedonian Orthodox Church and other religious communities and groups are 
separate from the state and equal before the law. 
The Macedonian Orthodox Church and other religious communities and groups are 
free to establish schools and other social and charitable institutions, by way of a pro-
cedure regulated by law. 
MACED. CONST. art. 19, in 11 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Macedonia 10. 
 119. See supra note 37. 
 120. de Sousa e Brito, supra note 11, at 571. 
 121. Russia, supra note 27, at 650 (according to the authors, this law “is not logical in 
this context with respect to all its provisions”). 
 122. Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra note 27, at 821. 
 123. It should be noted, however, that constitutional courts remain sensitive to inequali-
ties. See, e.g., Italy, supra note 51, at 436–38 (discussing Italian decisions involving blasphemy 
or construction permits). 
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countries where one religion dominates.124 These privileges manifest 
themselves in different ways,125 including procedures for recognizing 
and establishing churches, regulation of relations between particular 
churches, religious teaching and education, direct and indirect fi-
nancing or state support, and various other forms of state coopera-
tion and assistance. 
C. Differential Treatment of Religious Groups 
Constitutional courts are charged with the responsibility to up-
hold or to invalidate provisions that in theory give differential treat-
ment to churches and to determine the permissible scope of differen-
tial treatment between churches and religious groups. In making 
these determinations it is important to distinguish between theory 
and practice. For example, “the French system is the system of a 
strict equality—in the legal meaning—of religions,” while in practice 
“the legal equality is not matched by an actual equality.”126 This ab-
sence of actual equality impinges on legal equality and may be used 
as a justification for legal differentiations. “The principle of equality 
does not mean an absolute equality, it is relatively understood.. . . 
The absolute equality could lead to an unequal treatment of religious 
organizations.”127 
Various European courts have expressed this same principle. The 
German Constitutional Court stated in a 1965 opinion: “The Con-
stitution does not require the State to treat equally religious com-
munities in a schematic way.”128 Similarly, the Belgian Council of 
State held in a 1996 case: “Religious equality does not mean that the 
same regime must be applied to all religions.”129 The Austrian Con-
stitutional Court in a 1972 decision stated: “Differentiation between 
religious communities which are recognized by statute and other re-
 
 124. For statistical data on Lichtenstein, see Wille, supra note 19, at 457, and for Portu-
gal, see de Sousa e Brito, supra note 11, at 554. See also Czech Republic, supra note 104, at 
267; Slovenia, supra note 38, at 677. 
 125. See Italy, supra note 51, at 438 (providing examples in the realm of tax regulation in 
that country). 
 126. Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 307. 
 127. Slovenia, supra note 38, at 702. 
 128. Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 345 (quoting a 1965 decision of the Ger-
man Constitutional Court). 
 129. The original French states: “L’egalité des cultes n’implique pas que le même regime 
soit appliqué à tout les cultes.” Cerexhe & Boel, supra note 44, at 179 (quoting a 1996 deci-
sion of the Belgium Council of State). 
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ligions does not infringe the principle of equality.”130 Finally, “[t]he 
legislature is not prohibited by anything to include the specificity of 
religion and churches when establishing legal regulations implement-
ing the fundamental right to the freedom of religion.”131 
Thus, differentiation may be allowed provided that it is justified. 
The justification for differentiation must be substantial. Because “the 
general constitutional principle of equality also applies to churches 
and religious organizations . . . the differentiation before law requires 
a substantial justification which may be attributed to specific features 
of a given church or religious organization.” It is defined as “the 
parity in substantive law.”132 In Switzerland, the differentiation is 
admitted: “the significance of main religions as regards their strength 
and history, their public and charity tasks effected by national 
churches.”133 The German Federal Constitutional Court indicated 
that the premises of providing public and legal status to a given 
church are “a conviction of the State that such churches are particu-
larly effective when provided with the status of public institution, 
that they enjoy a very important position in the society, and that 
there is a guarantee of durability resulting from it.”134 
Fundamental differentiation flows from a division between rec-
ognized churches and others churches and religious organizations. 
In registration systems, churches and religious groups which fail to 
become registered may even be deprived of the possibility to act. 
And equality is not even assured for churches that do become regis-
tered. In this context, the German Constitutional Court emphasized: 
it is forbidden to make a further differentiation inside religious 
groups of recognized religious communities of public institution 
status unless unequal treatment would be permissible under the 
general principle of equality. The Federal Constitutional Court has 
rejected the attempts to indicate tradition and history or religious 
thesis as substantial justification for unequal treatment.135 
 
 
 130. Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 124 (quoting a 1972 decision of the Austrian 
Constitutional Court). 
 131. Adam, supra note 37, at 366. 
 132. Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 124. 
 133. Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra note 27, at 821 (quoting decisions of the Swiss 
Federal Court from 1917 and 1997). 
 134. Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 344. 
 135. Id. 
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But at the same time, in Austria, certain privileges for the Catho-
lic Church “may be to a large extent both justified by the fact that 
we deal with the former state religion and approximately 78% of the 
Austrian population is still in the Catholic church as well as by the 
existing concordats with the Holy See.”136 The Italian Constitutional 
Court, in reviewing penal sanctions for blasphemy, observed that the 
argument of a number of church members may not justify the refer-
ence of contempt of religious feelings only to the Catholic religion as 
the difference between the Catholic religion as the only state religion 
and other religions recognized by the state is no longer valid in It-
aly.137 
In conclusion, the limits of permitted differentiation are deter-
mined by the scope of the prohibition against discriminatory treat-
ment. It is inappropriate, for instance, to grant unjustified privileges 
to only one church, namely, to make its position more advantageous 
in contrast not only to other churches but also to citizens gener-
ally.138 The differences in approach may not be significant enough to 
prevent the existence of a given religious community, but each 
community has to be guaranteed “a possibility of some form of legal 
existence.”139 Thus, the regulations of the principle of equality may 
not be transformed into the regulation of freedom to establish 
churches and to exercise religion.140 
V.  RELIGIOUS TEACHING AND THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM141 
Religious teaching constitutes one of the fundamental elements 
of religious freedom.142 Putting aside purely private religious instruc-
tion in church or at home, which in principle is beyond any state in-
terference, religious teaching in the public sphere may not be viewed 
separately from the regulations governing the educational system 
 
 136. Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 124. 
 137. See Italy, supra note 51, at 427. 
 138. The Spanish Judgment of 1993 regarding the legislation on lease is an example of 
this point. 
 139. The German Judgments. See Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10. 
 140. For an example of this, see the Turkish Judgment applicable to the Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses and disqualifying the differentiation into “celestial” and “non-celestial” religions. 
 141. See XIIE TABLE RONDE INTERNATIONALE: L’ÉCOLE, LA RELIGION ET LA 
CONSTITUTION, XII ANNUAIRE INTERNATIONAL DE JUSTICE CONSTITUTIONNELLE 125 
(1996) [hereinafter L’ÉCOLE ET LA RELIGION]. 
 142. This principle is illustrated in Article 9 of the European Convention. See supra note 
8 (reprinting Article 9). 
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generally. There are two fundamental issues implicated here. First is 
the issue of freedom to establish private schools that are affiliated 
with particular churches or religious organizations. A subsidiary 
question arises about the permissibility and the range of state support 
for such schools and their students. But it should be remembered 
that the role of private schools is defined primarily by the presence of 
religious instruction in public schools143 and the scope of direct fi-
nancial support of the state for churches and religion organizations. 
Second is the issue of the permissibility and the scope of religious 
teaching in public schools. A question arises as to how to relate par-
ticular churches with the operation of public school system. Both is-
sues have been extensively addressed in the case law of constitutional 
courts. 
A. Private Schools 
1. Constitutional provisions relating to religiously-affiliated private 
schools 
Generally, the constitutional position of private schools is deter-
mined by freedom of instruction, which, in many countries, is clearly 
guaranteed in the Constitution.144 The role of private schools is par-
ticularly emphasized in Germany: Article 7, Sections 4 and 5 of the 
Grundgesetz describe private schools as “supplementing [the] public 
school system.” Thus, the “guarantee for a private school as an insti-
tution” is appropriately provided for.145 In Italy, Article 33 of the 
 
 143. Only in France, secular public education is understood to mean the exclusion of 
religious teaching. 
 144. See, e.g., SPAIN CONST. art. 27, § 3, in 17 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Spain 
48–49 (providing generally for the freedom of teaching) (“The public authorities shall guaran-
tee the right which will assist parents to have the children receive religious and moral formation 
which is in keeping with their own convictions.”); ITALY CONST. art. 33, § 3, in 11 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Italy 54 (“Organizations and private citizens are entitled to 
found schools and educational institutions which do not involve charges on the State.”); BELG. 
CONST. art. 24, quoted supra note 63; POL. CONST. art. 70, § 3, in 15 CONSTITUTIONS, su-
pra note 12, at Poland 16 (“Parents have the right to choose schools other than public for 
their children. Citizens and institutions have the right to establish primary and secondary 
schools and institutions of higher education . . . .”). In France, freedom of instruction is con-
sidered one of the fundamental principles recognized by the Laws of the Republic. See Bas-
devant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 313. 
 145. Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 338–39 (citing a decision of the Federal 
Constitutional Court referred therein. 
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1947 Constitution guarantees the right to establish schools “without 
encumbering the State.” The 1976 Constitution of Portugal at first, 
characterized private schools as “supplementary education” (Article 
75, Section 1). However, in the 1982 Amendment, private and pub-
lic education were set on equal footing. Article 2 of the First Proto-
col of the European Convention on Human Rights ensures freedom 
of religious instruction, at least with respect to the teaching of reli-
gious and philosophical beliefs.146 
Freedom of religious instruction is understood to mean the free-
dom to establish and operate private schools, the freedom to deter-
mine the content of the curriculum, and freedom of parents to 
choose an appropriate school for their children.147 In particular, it is 
the freedom to create a school with a character that may include “an 
attachment to religious values.”148 Thus, this freedom includes “that 
which concerns form as well as the content of education.”149 
It follows that a private school may be affiliated with a specific re-
ligion. Indeed, it is very rare for religious organizations to be banned 
from establishing private schools.150 In many countries, there is no 
difference in the legal requirements for private religious schools as 
opposed to schools with no religious character. However, sometimes 
schools that are operated by or affiliated with religious entities are 
granted privileges, namely granting rights of public school and state 
financial support (e.g., Austria and Hungary). This is partially attrib-
utable to concordat provisions (e.g., Spain, Austria, Italy, and Portu-
gal), but mostly to the more general constitutional context of reli-
gious freedoms. If the freedom of parents to choose a school is to be 
real then not only religiously-affiliated schools must be able to exist 
but the state has to treat them in a similar manner as public  
 
 
 
 
 146. See Wille, supra note 19, at 474 (citing a 1995 decision of the State Court). 
 147. See de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at 892–93 (discussing a 1991 deci-
sion of the Constitutional Court). 
 148. Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 321. 
 149. Cerexhe & Boel, supra note 44, at 188 (citing a 1992 decision of the Cour 
d’Arbitrage) (“ce qui concerne la forme que pour ce qui est du contenu d’enseignement.”). 
 150. See Turkey, supra note 25, at 847. In Macedonia “public and private schools are 
secular, that is, religion neutral.” Macedonia, supra note 28, at 509. 
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schools.151 Finally, only recognized or registered religions are gener-
ally allowed to run private schools.152 
2. Limitations on the freedom of religious instruction 
As with religious liberty generally, freedom of instruction is not 
absolute. All countries have established state supervisory measures to 
monitor the establishment and operation of private schools. Usually, 
a state authorization is required to establish a school. However, it is 
virtually impossible to refuse permission if a school fulfils the re-
quirements provided for by law.153 State authorities are entitled to 
request reports and information from schools and have the power to 
lustrate the operation of the school. In sum, private schools fill a 
substantial public mission and their operation is directly linked to the 
public interest.154 However, supervisory regulations may not be so 
extensive as to deprive a school of its private status and unique char-
acter. 
Private school relations with the state if they seek analogous 
status to public schools, in particular with regard to the recognition 
of school diplomas and the right to obtain subsidies. The system of 
contracts between public authorities and private schools is applied in 
some countries (e.g., France and Spain) and other countries adopt a 
system of granting private schools a status of public school (e.g., 
Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, and Slovakia). Because it is 
only when private schools receive equal status with public schools 
that they will have a more lasting presence, in many countries one 
may speak about the claim of private schools to be granted such 
status. For example, in Austria, Concordat provisions provided for 
the granting of public school status to all schools existing within the 
framework of Catholic Church. This automatic application has been 
extended to schools run by other recognized religions. 
 
 151. See, e.g., Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 314; Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra 
note 26, at 149; Cerexhe & Boel, supra note 44, at 185; Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, 
at 328. For Hungary it is indicated that the State “may not refuse a legal possibility of exis-
tence for schools which are based on or oriented towards religion or atheism.” Adam, supra 
note 37, at 374. 
 152. See, e.g., Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 127. 
 153. For example, see Article 7, Section 4 of the German Constitution as well as the 
Judgment of the Italian Corte Costituzionale of 1958. 
 154. See de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at 792; Cerexhe & Boel, supra note 
44, at 187. 
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However, numerous obligations for private schools flow from re-
ceiving equal status with public schools, which in turn leads to the 
abdication of some of their autonomy. This may be manifested in a 
limited ability to select students,155 the duty to respect all students’ 
religious faiths,156 the duty to provide free education,157 or the obli-
gation to accept teachers designated by public authorities. 
3. The subsidization of private education 
Subsidy by public authority of private education is one of the 
most delicate issues in education. None of the countries discussed 
herein have adopted the U.S. concept of a complete separation that 
prohibits direct state financial support for religiously-affiliated 
schools. Consequently, there is no constitutional ban against subsi-
dizing private schools, regardless of their religious affiliation. In prac-
tice, many countries finance almost entirely the operation of private 
schools (including personnel costs and schoolbooks) where the 
schools have been granted the status of a public school or have en-
tered into agreements with public authorities providing for this sub-
sidy. 
Notwithstanding this practice, it is unclear if subsidizing private 
schools with public funds is merely allowed under the Constitution 
or whether such subsidizing is constitutionally required. In Switzer-
land, it is accepted that there is no “claim” by private schools to pub-
lic funds.158 In several countries, however, a requirement to subsidize 
private schools has been interpreted as constitutionally required. The 
rationale suggests that the equality principle requires state subsidy so 
that parental choice for the education of their children in religiously-
affiliated schools would not be inhibited.159 
 
 
 155. See Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 322; Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra 
note 27, at 831. 
 156. See Adam, supra note 37, at 368; de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at 
799. 
 157. See Cerexhe & Boel, supra note 44, at 189. 
 158. See Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra note 27, at 831; see also Wille, supra note 19, at 
476 (discussing a 1996 decision of the State Court of Lichtenstein). 
 159. See Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 323 (discussing a 1977 decision of the 
Conseil Constitutionnel). See also the 1993 decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, 
as well as the 1966 decision of the Federal Administrative Court and the 1987 of the Federal 
Constitutional Court in Germany. 
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The scope of the obligation to subsidize is also not uniform. For 
example, the German Constitutional Court has stated 
that the obligation to finance the replacement schools (Er-
satzschulen) in need is only permitted if the financial standing of 
such schools would be endangered without intervention of the 
state or if the departure from the equality of public and private 
schools would make it impossible to enjoy the freedom of educa-
tion. Within such frameworks, the legislature is granted a vast dis-
cretion to determine the manner of meeting such obligations.160 
In Belgium, granting subsidies is limited,  
on the one hand, through the ability of the Community to tie the 
subsidies to requirements of general interest, among others that of 
quality education and of the standards of the school population 
and, on the other hand, because of the need to distribute the avail-
able financial means among the many missions of the Commu-
nity.161 
The issue of subsidization also relates to the principle of equality, 
both pertaining to the relationship between private and public 
schools as well as to the relationship among private schools of vari-
ous types. In Belgium, differentiation of churches and religious or-
ganizations is admitted under Article 24, Section 4 of the Constitu-
tion which requires “the consideration of objective differences.”162 
Thus, as long as the criteria of proportionality and justification are 
met, there will be no constitutional violation.163 According to Ger-
man case law, the state may not treat replacement schools in a worse 
manner than public schools simply because of their differences in 
curriculum or methodology.164 In Italy, financing the transportation 
of public school students has been upheld even where there is no 
provision for the transportation of private school students. But no 
reservations have surfaced in Italy as to the financing of schoolbooks 
in both types of schools.165 
 
 
 
 160. 75 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, at 67. 
 161. Cerexhe & Boel, supra note 44, at 188 (discussing a 1998 decision). 
 162. 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Belgium 4. 
 163. Cerexhe & Boel, supra note 44, at 189 (citing a 1992 decision). 
 164. See Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 338. 
 165. See Italy, supra note 51, at 448. 
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Questions of constitutionality may also arise if a private school 
acquires a privileged position in regard to public schools.166 In Aus-
tria, the differentiation of the status of religiously-affiliated schools 
and other private schools with public school status does not infringe 
the principle of equality.167 
4. The employment of teachers in religiously-affiliated private schools 
Religiously-affiliated private schools may impose specific re-
quirements with respect to its teachers. In principle, a private school 
is free to create the criterion for selecting its teachers. However, if a 
private school is granted public school status or enters into contracts 
with public authorities, then the selection of teachers, to a large ex-
tent, is taken over by the state. 
Generally speaking, employment at a private school does not de-
prive a teacher of constitutional rights, including the freedom of be-
lief.168 Nevertheless, it is assumed that teachers have a duty to respect 
the religious character of schools where they are employed. For ex-
ample, the Constitutional Court of Spain indicated that a teacher’s 
duty of respect does not force him to act as a defender of school-
supported ideology, to transform his lessons into indoctrination, or 
to subordinate scientific systems or truth to the school-supported 
ideology. Nevertheless, teaching which is hostile or contradictory to 
the ideology of a school may constitute grounds for dismissal. Dis-
missal may not be based solely on a teacher’s faith but must be re-
lated to specific actions.169 In Austria, a school may request to trans-
fer a teacher170 if further employment of the teacher is not possible 
for religious reasons.171 In Liechtenstein, teachers may be required to 
 
 166. See the 1994 decision of the French Conseil Constitutionnel, declaring unconstitu-
tionality of legislation abolishing subvention limits in regard to private schools and subsequent 
decisions of the Conseil d’État following the same direction. See Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra 
note 14, at 324. 
 167. See Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26 at 146. This is similar for Hungary. See Adam, 
supra note 37, at 376. 
 168. See the 1977 and 1985 decisions of the Conseil Constitutionnel. See Basdevant-
Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 324. 
 169. See de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at 802, and the decision referred to 
therein. 
 170. In schools of public status, such decisions are made by public authorities. 
 171. See Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 150. This is similar to the Italian decision 
of 1972 regarding the effects of withdrawal of the church authority approval for a professor of 
Catholic university. 
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meet “ethical qualifications.”172 Finally, in Italy, evaluations of a 
teacher’s disposition towards religion may be made, but the 1984 
Amendment to the Concordat abolished the criterion of moral 
evaluation.173 
B.  Public School 
1. The teaching of religion in public schools 
The teaching of religion in public schools should be viewed with 
the background and nature of the state in mind. State-religion neu-
trality exists in most of the countries discussed in this article. Thus, 
public schools in such countries tend to be neutral rather than reli-
gious schools. However, just as state neutrality does not imply indif-
ference174 or disregard for religion but rather guarantees “freedom of 
religion in pluralistic system[s] of religions and cultures,”175 the no-
tion of a neutral public school does not obligate a school to be 
purely secular or require complete separation of religious teaching 
from a school’s curriculum. 
In Belgium, the 1994 Decree sets forth principles of neutrality.176 
In Spain, the principle of neutral schools and the respect of religious 
and moral ideas are considered fundamental. It means, in particular, 
banning a school from imposing a specific faith or religion “with an 
apologetic content or with the goal of indoctrination and not purely 
for informational purposes.”177 In Portugal, the 1976 Constitution, 
Article 43, Section 3 provides that “public education may not be of 
religious character.” However, against the background of the state 
not being agnostic, atheistic, or secular, this constitutional provision 
does not prohibit cooperation between church and state.178 
 
 
 172. Wille, supra note 19, at 476. 
 173. See A. Pizzorusso, Italie, in L’ÉCOLE ET LA RELIGION, supra note 141, at 269 
(1996). 
 174. See Adam, supra note 37, at 377 (discussing a 1996 decision of the Constitutional 
Court). 
 175. Id. at 272. 
 176. See Cerexhe & Boel, supra note 44, at 189. 
 177. de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at 804 (citing a 1991 decision of the 
Constitutional Court) (“avec un contenu apologétique ou dans un but d’endoctrinement et 
non purement informative.”). 
 178. See de Sousa e Brito, supra note 11, at 589. 
GAR-PP1.DOC 6/25/01  9:07 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
502 
Interpretations of state neutrality or laicité are not uniform in all 
countries. In France, emphasis is placed on separation of public 
school and religion; while “no religion is privileged, all are re-
spected.”179 In Hungary, the Constitutional Court requires that 
“neutral public school cannot be committed to any religion or 
worldview; it must make free and well founded choices possible.”180 
In many countries of Western Europe, neutrality does not neces-
sarily exclude a direct link to the Christian tradition and value sys-
tem. While the German Constitution has guaranteed the existence of 
non-religious public schools, in the German Federal Republic, the 
operation of public schools with Christian character is not prohibited 
by Lander, even if a minority group does not want such religious in-
fluence. However, there are limits to the teaching of religion in pub-
lic schools. While the teaching of religion in churches focuses on 
specific religious precepts, public schools aim to pass on more gen-
eral Christian values. Such schools are different from mission schools. 
They must limit compulsory elements, be open to other religious 
and philosophical ideas and values, and the upbringing aim of school 
cannot be Christian and religion oriented, a significance should be 
attached to the principle of tolerance.181  
In Spain, according to the agreement between the state and 
Holy See, the educational process in public schools must respect 
Christian values and ethics.182 The Portuguese Concordat183 and the 
1984 Amendment to the Italian Concordat include similar provi-
sions.184 In Austria, the Act on Organization of Education states that 
the objective of public schools is to help in the upbringing of youth 
“in the spirit of customary, religious and social values as well as in 
Truth, Good and Beauty.”185 In Liechtenstein, under the Lande-
skirche model, the Constitution provides that one of the main  
 
 
 179. Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 316. 
 180. Decision 4/1993. See G. BRUNNER & L. SOLYOM, VERFASSUNGSGERICHTS 
BARKEIT IN UNGARN, BADEN-BADEN 421 (1995). 
 181. See Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 336 (discussing a 1975 decision of the 
Federal Constitutional Court). 
 182. See de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at 806. 
 183. A challenge to its constitutionality has been rejected by the Constitutional Court. 
See L. Nunes de Almeida & R. Mendes, Portugal, in L’ÉCOLE ET LA RELIGION, supra note 
141, at 308–13 [hereinafter Nunes de Almeida & Mendes]. 
 184. See decision 203/1997 of the Corte Costituzionale. 
 185. Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 107. 
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tasks of upbringing and education is religious and ethical forma-
tion.186 
2. Neutrality allows for the teaching of religion in public schools 
The principle of neutrality in many European countries is not 
viewed as the obligation to separate public schools from Christian 
values and traditions. Rather, it allows for the teaching of religion as 
part of the comprehensive operation of public schools. 
European countries have not followed the American model of 
imposing constitutional bans on the teaching of religion in public 
schools. Even in France, where secularism in school means that “re-
ligious instruction is not part of scholastic programs,” this prohibi-
tion refers to primary schools only, whereas in secondary schools, it 
is possible to organize chaplaincies.187 Also, in Eastern European 
states, where the principle of secular schools is emphasized, public 
school buildings may be used for the teaching of religion outside the 
regular school schedule as a supplement to the school curriculum.188 
In many countries, the Constitution neither prohibits nor re-
quires the organization of the teaching of religion in public schools. 
In these countries, this area of lawmaking is left to the legislature.189 
Constitutional courts have recognized that the introduction of relig-
ion in public schools does not infringe constitutional rights per se 
but have also recognized that various requirements and specific guar-
antees must be met.190 Although the teaching of religion in public 
schools does not violate constitutional provisions per se, parents and 
students do not necessarily have the right to require such teaching.191 
In other countries, the constitution requires the organization of 
the teaching of religion in public schools. Article 7, Section 3 of the 
 
 186. See Wille, supra note 19, at 468. 
 187. Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 314 (“instruction religieuse ne fait pas par-
tie de programmes scholaires”). 
 188. See Russia, supra note 27, at 657; Macedonia, supra note 28, at 508; Slovenia, supra 
note 38, at 714. 
 189. See Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 139. 
 190. See the 1981 decision of the Spanish Constitutional Court, de Mendizabal Allende 
et al., supra note 27, at 806; the decisions of the Portuguese Constitutional Commission and 
Constitutional Court of 1982, 1987 and 1993, Nunes de Almeida & Mendes, supra note 183, 
at 308–13; the 1991 decision of the Polish Constitutional Court, Leszek Lech Garlicki, 
Pologne, in L’ÉCOLE ET LA RELIGION, supra note 141, at 287; and the 1997 decision of the 
Romanian Constitutional Court, Romania, supra note 56, at 636. 
 191. See Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra note 27, at 829. 
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German Constitution allows for the teaching of religion in all public 
schools that are not specifically designated as non-religious schools. 
In Belgium, Article 24, Section 1 of the constitution guarantees pub-
lic school students the choice between studying a recognized religion 
or non-religious ethics. In the Czech Republic, the teaching of relig-
ion in state schools is provided for by Article 16, Section 3 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.192 In Poland, the 
teaching of religion in public schools must be introduced at the re-
quest of parents.193 Countries such as Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Po-
land that may have a duty under Concordat provisions to introduce 
the teaching of religion in public schools, may also have a duty, un-
der principles of equality, to do so for all religions. The organization 
of religious teaching in such countries is a constitutional task of the 
state and other public authorities.194 
In order to prevent public schools from becoming religious 
schools, the teaching of religion in public schools may not be limited 
to one religion. However, identical treatment and recognition of all 
existing religions is not required.195 The teaching of religion in pub-
lic schools may be limited to the teaching of recognized churches. 
Another possibility may be to base the right to teach religious doc-
trine in public schools on the stage of development and degree of 
the public approval of such doctrine.196 
3. The teaching of religion as an integral part of the school curriculum 
The teaching of religion may take place on school premises with-
out a direct link to school curriculum, or it may constitute an inte-
 
 192. Article 16, Section 3 states, “The law establishes the conditions of religious instruc-
tion at state schools.” 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Czech Republic 157. 
 193. Article 53, Section 4 of the 1997 Constitution provides, “The religion of a church 
or other legally recognized religious organization may be taught in schools, but others peoples’ 
freedom of religion and conscience shall both be infringed thereby.” 15 CONSTITUTIONS, su-
pra note 12, at Poland 12. 
Already in the beginning of 1990s, case law has determined that the elimination of relig-
ion from public schools would be contradictory to the principle of individual freedom of relig-
ion, see Maczynski, supra note 53, at 538–39; a similar position was adopted by the Portuguese 
Court in a 1987 decision, see Nunes de Almeida & Mendes, supra note 183, at 308–13. 
 194. See Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 338; Wille, supra note 19, at 469; Ro-
mania, supra note 56, at 635. 
 195. See Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 338. 
 196. See Adam, supra note 37, at 276 (discussing decision 6/1993 of the Constitutional 
Court). 
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gral part of the school process of teaching and upbringing. While the 
former system exists in countries that emphasize the principle of 
secular schools like Russia and Macedonia, the latter system exists in 
the majority of countries discussed in this article. 
In such countries, religion classes are treated as ordinary sub-
jects.197 They are taught on equivalent terms as other classes,198 are 
totally integrated in the school’s curriculum and schedule, and are 
graded like other subjects. Religion teachers are members of the 
educational staff, and public authorities bear the costs of their salaries 
and social security. However, in each country, details regarding these 
matters differ slightly. 
States have set their own standards with regard to the curriculum 
of religious classes. In Germany,199 religious lessons do not consist of 
a neutral comparison of religious doctrines. Rather, the lessons must 
teach specific beliefs of a given religious community. The given 
church’s ideas on teaching are binding on the school. In Austria, the 
teaching of religion in schools is considered an internal operation of 
recognized churches and religious groups.200 A 1991 Polish Consti-
tutional Court decision indicated that due to the principle of state 
neutrality, the content of religious teaching should be determined by 
church authority and not by the state.201 
Just as various forms of cooperation and supervision between 
churches and public authorities exist,202 various views on grades for 
religion classes and their significance exist in different countries. In 
some countries, grades for religion classes are not listed on school 
report cards.203 In other countries, grades are listed but do not affect 
graduation or further education,204 and in other countries, religion 
grades are treated the same as grades for other subjects.205 
 
 197. See Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 337. 
 198. See de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at 806; Italy, supra note 51, at 453. 
 199. See Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 327, 450 (discussing the case of Land of 
Brandenburg). 
 200. See Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 140. 
 201. See G. BRUNNER & LESZEK LECH GARLICKI, VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN 
POLEN, BADEN-BADEN 119 (1999). 
 202. See de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at 806; Wille, supra note 19, at 
469. 
 203. See Adam, supra note 37, at 376; Slovak Republic, supra note 45 at 673. 
 204. See de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at 807; de Sousa e Brito, supra note 
11, at 585. 
 205. See Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 142; Romania, supra note 56, at 636. 
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The position and status of religion teachers may vary from coun-
try to country. For example, in Spain, religion teachers may not be 
school headmasters because religion teachers are only employed on 
one-year contracts. Generally, there are no objections to a clerical 
person teaching in public schools.206 However, it is essential for ap-
propriate church authorities to approve a teacher (missio canonica in 
the Catholic Church). 
Although the teaching of religion in public schools is obligatory, 
attendance is optional and depends on the decision of parents and 
students. The right to choose whether or not to participate in reli-
gious classes is an essential element of the principle of religious free-
dom.207 Here a question arises, among others, about the appropriate 
form of declarations submitted: in Portugal and in Poland the Con-
stitutional Courts have indicated that the Constitution guarantee the 
“right to silence” as regards religious beliefs. Thus only “positive” 
declarations are permissible, where the request to participate in relig-
ion classes is declared.208 
The teaching of religion must take into account the principle of 
religious pluralism. Thus, if public schools organize the teaching of 
one religion, they must ensure comparable conditions for the teach-
ing of other religions. However, as mentioned above, such guaran-
tees of equality are usually limited to recognized or registered relig-
ions. Countries differ in the implementation of this principle, 
especially in countries where one religion is dominant.209  
The principle of religious pluralism also requires the protection 
of non-believers or those who, for other reasons, do not fit the 
school’s religious curriculum. The majority of countries provide al-
ternative classes in ethics or moral formation for such students. In 
Belgium, such lessons cannot defend any specific philosophical sys-
tem or be inspired by militant secularism.210 However, in some coun-
tries, mandatory attendance at alternative classes is unconstitu-
 
 206. See, e.g., Cerexhe & Boel, supra note 44, at 193; Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, 
at 141; Czech Republic, supra note 104, at 277. 
 207. See Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 336; de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra 
note 27, at 796; Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 139; Italy, supra note 51, at 451; de 
Sousa e Brito, supra note 11, at 585; Romania, supra note 56, at 636; Czech Republic, supra 
note 104, at 276. 
 208. See Garlicki, supra note 190, at 288; de Sousa e Brito, supra note 11, at 586. 
 209. See de Sousa e Brito, supra note 11, at 584. 
 210. See Cerexhe & Boel, supra note 44, at 193. 
GAR-PP1.DOC 6/25/01  9:07 PM 
467] Perspectives on Freedom of Conscience 
 507 
tional.211 In Belgium, students do not have to attend religion or eth-
ics classes; in Switzerland, a release from Bible history classes may be 
requested.212 
VI. PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE TEACHING OF RELIGION IN 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
Various problems may arise from the presence of religion in pub-
lic schools. One such problem involves the placement of religious 
symbols, like crosses and crucifixes, in classrooms or on school prem-
ises. In some countries this is not allowed.213 For example, in Ger-
many and Switzerland, the constitutional courts banned the place-
ment of crosses and crucifixes in public schools. The Swiss decision 
of 1990 stated that the placement of religious symbols in public 
schools violated the neutrality of religious teaching, which is consti-
tutionally protected. The decision also referred to the state’s obliga-
tion to ensure religious peace.214 The German Court, in its 1995 de-
cision, indicated that since the meaning of a cross could not be 
reduced to a general symbol of Western culture, placing one in the 
classroom or school would transgress the admissible religious and 
world-view nature of schools. The Court further stated that since 
students who did not believe in the crucifix would not be able to 
avoid the presence of a cross placed in the classroom, such placement 
would infringe upon their freedom of religion.215 However, in other 
countries, no objections arise as to the placement of crosses in class-
rooms.216 In Austria, under the provisions of the Concordat, a cross 
must be placed in the classroom if the majority of students are 
Catholic.217 
 
 
 
 211. See Pizzorusso, supra note 173, at 272 (discussing Italian decision no. 203/1989). 
 212. See Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra note 27, at 829; see also Kucsko-Stadlmayer, 
supra note 26, at 139. 
 213. See, e.g., Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 318; Adam, supra note 37, at 376; 
Slovenia, supra note 38, at 714; Czech Republic, supra note 104, at 277; de Sousa e Brito, su-
pra note 11, at 562 (noting that a similar situation exists in Spain). 
 214. See Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra note 27, at 817. 
 215. See Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 337. 
 216. Wille, supra note 19, at 473; Maczynski, supra note 53, at 547; Romania, supra 
note 56, at 636. 
 217. See Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 174. 
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School prayer may also pose problems.218 In some countries, 
school prayer is not expressly allowed or prohibited.219 In other 
countries, school prayer is allowed as long as participation is volun-
tary.220 According to the 1993 decision of the Polish Constitutional 
Court, states would violate the prohibition on their right to interfere 
in religious practices by denying students the opportunity to pray.221 
Religious outfits of students and various religious symbols worn 
by them have also caused problems. In particular, the Council of 
State in France has dealt several times with the issue of Islamic girls 
wearing head scarves. In 1989, the Council decided that although 
wearing religious symbols is, as a principle, protected by the freedom 
of religion, this freedom does not protect the ostentatious display of 
religious symbols that would constitute acts of pressure, provocation, 
proselytism, or propaganda and that could violate the dignity or 
freedom of other students, endanger their health or safety, or ob-
struct an educational process or school order. This decision has been 
applied in subsequent cases.222 In Belgium, as indicated by F. 
Delperee, the wearing of head scarves is protected by the Constitu-
tion, but it may be banned if it is objectively justified (for instance, 
with respect to physical education lessons or sports). Furthermore, a 
broader limitation may apply to non-religious teachers since they 
have a general duty to “exercise reserve” and not to impose, in any 
way, their religious ideas or approach onto their students.223 Thus, a 
teacher may be banned from wearing a head scarf 224 or a Buddhist 
monk outfit and neck chain.225 
Finally, the question of whether students have a right to be ex-
cused from certain lessons or school attendance based on their reli-
 
 218. The Supreme Court of the United States has expressed its view on this matter mul-
tiple times. 
 219. See, e.g., Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 320; Adam, supra note 37, at 376; 
Slovenia, supra note 38, at 714; Czech Republic, supra note 104, at 277. 
 220. See, e.g., Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 336; Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra 
note 26, at 13; Romania, supra note 56, at 636; Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra note 27, at 
829; Wille, supra note 19, at 473. 
 221. See BRUNNER & GARLICKI, supra note 201, at 191–92. 
 222. See Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 319. 
 223. Isensee/Kirchhof: Handbuch des Staatsrechts der BRD, Bd. 6, Heidelberg 1989, at 
360. 
 224. See Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra note 27, at 830 (discussing a 1997 decision of 
the Swiss Bundesgericht). 
 225. See O. Jouanjan, Allemagne, in L’ÉCOLE ET LA RELIGION, supra note 141, at 164 
(discussing a 1988 decision of the German Federal Administrative Court). 
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gious beliefs has been raised. Islamic girls have been excused from 
swimming lessons with boys without serious question.226 However, 
more doubts have been raised with regard to permanent school ab-
sence on Saturdays or Fridays. In France, although the duty to at-
tend school is considered fundamental and general excuses would in-
fringe the appropriate operation of schools, individual excuses due to 
religious holidays have been allowed.227 Similarly, the 1993 decision 
of the Swiss Bundesgericht stated that while freedom of religion does 
not exempt people from respecting civic duties, the principle of pro-
portionality allows students to be excused from classes as long as the 
organization and efficiency of teaching is not affected and the reli-
gious beliefs of other students are not infringed.228 In other coun-
tries, permanent absence from school on Saturdays due to religious 
beliefs has been allowed.229 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 226. See Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra note 27, at 830; see also Jouanjan, supra note 
225, at 163 (discussing a 1993 decision of the German Federal Administrative Court ). 
 227. See Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 319. 
 228. See B. Knapp, Suisse, in L’ÉCOLE ET LA RELIGION, supra note 141, at 319–20. 
 229. See Jouanjan, supra note 225, at 163 (discussing a decision of the German Federal 
Administrative Court concerning the Seventh-Day Adventists). For Austria, see O. Pfersmann, 
Autriche in L’ÉCOLE ET LA RELIGION, supra note 141, at 174–75. 
GAR-PP1.DOC 6/25/01  9:07 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
510 
 
 
 
